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Art, as discussed in the third book of Arthur Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and 
Representation, plays a double role in his philosophical system. On one hand, 
beholding an object of aesthetic worth provides the spectator with a temporary 
cessation of the otherwise incessant suffering that Schopenhauer takes life to be; on 
the other, art creates an epistemological bridge between ourselves and the world as it 
really is: unlike science which only studies relations between things, contemplation of 
art leads to knowledge of that which is “alone really essential to the world, the true 
content of its phenomena.” (WWR1: 184) It is this second aspect of Schopenhauer's 
aesthetics that is both appealing and curious: while Schopenhauer's aesthetics and 
epistemology are both rooted in his picture of the world as Will, which is (taken at 
face value) deeply counter-intuitive, it yet seems to me that by assigning epistemic 
value to art, he manages to capture the quality of profundity with which certain works 
of art strike us – a profundity that is accounted for neither by reference to mere 
enjoyment nor by reference to paraphrasable, propositional knowledge. It is this 
tension between the plausible and extravagant elements of Schopenhauer's philosophy 
of art that I will try to relieve in this paper. I will firstly point to the difficulties that 
Schopenhauer's account runs into when we consider his treatment of Platonic Ideas, 
and will then suggest a way in which Schopenhauer's insights about aesthetics can 
still be preserved, if we separate them from a literal reading of his metaphysics. 
 The way in which Schopenhauer's account of the epistemic value of aesthetic 
experience arises out of his metaphysical position can perhaps be best characterised 
by invoking the two main points of difference between his idealism and that of Kant. 
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For Schopenhauer, as for Kant, the world as representation (the world as we normally 
perceive it) does not match the mind-independent, noumenal reality. Schopenhauer, 
however, diverges from Kant in his explanation as to why this is so: for him, our 
mode of perception is a consequence of the survival mechanism of the will and thus 
the primary task of our perceptual organs and our mental capacities is to shape the 
world as representation in such a way as to give best expression to our willing nature 
(cf. WWR2: 284-5). The chief corollary of this is that even the most fundamental 
features of the world as representation – the categories of space, time and causality – 
are imposed upon the world for the purposes of the will. That is because it is only 
through these categories that causal, spatial and temporal relations can obtain between 
the willing subject and the objects of will: “only through these (relations) is the object 
interesting to the individual, in other words, has it a relation to the will.” (WWR1: 
177) Put otherwise, the world-will, acting through willing human subjects, structures 
the world as representation so that a plurality of objects, individuated through the 
categories of space, time and causality, appears. Such individuating of phenomena is 
necessary for relations of willing to obtain between them.  
Connected to this is Schopenhauer's second departure from Kant: he holds that it is 
exceptionally possible to transcend the world as phenomena and come into contact 
with reality: this happens in rare cases where a particularly developed human intellect 
is able to lay aside the force that structures the world into the categories of space, time 
and causality – the subject's own willing nature. For Schopenhauer, this profound shift 
in perception which allows us to come into touch with the thing-in-itself is what 
constitutes an aesthetic experience. This rare “objective tendency of the mind”, that is, 
the ability to suspend the intellect's ordinary instrumental calibration and to 
contemplate the world as it is in-itself, Schopenhauer calls “genius”. He writes: 
 
[W]e relinquish the ordinary way of considering things, and cease to follow under the 
guidance of the forms of the principle of sufficient reason [i.e. forms of space, time, 
causality] merely their relations to one another, whose final goal is always the relation to 
our own will. Thus we no longer consider the where, the when, the why, and the whither in 
things, but simply and solely the what… (WWR1: 178) 
 
These talented individuals are able to suspend their will in such a way as to observe 
not particular objects in the world, such as particular clouds, but to perceive in them 
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what is essential to them – as clouds were before they were made into individual 
instantiations through the phenomenal matrix of space, time and causality. (WWR1: 
185-6) But just as genius is unequally distributed among men, so there are also some 
natural objects that exemplify the essential properties of their species better than 
others. These objects are then more “beautiful” than others, since the essential, pre-
phenomenal nature of things is more easily grasped when it is beautiful objects that 
are contemplated (WWR1: 209).  
But what is it that is being thus contemplated? Schopenhauer equates objects when 
they are known in-themselves with Platonic Ideas, which Schopenhauer views as 
kinds of eternal species that display unchanging, essential characteristics of groups of 
objects. For example, particular clouds and their many shapes are only phenomenal 
and ephemeral, but the Idea of the clouds is “that as elastic vapour they are pressed 
together, driven off, spread out, and torn apart by the force of the wind, this is their 
nature, this is the essence of the forces objectified in them, this is the Idea.” (WWR1: 
182) The genius's aesthetic knowledge, then, consists of direct perception of the 
essential nature of a species of things, attained through will-less contemplation of 
beautiful objects. 
It may seem strange that Schopenhauer is trying to fit Platonic Ideas into his 
system, and that it is them rather than the thing-in-itself (that is, the Will), which are 
the objects of aesthetic knowledge. The reason for this is that for Schopenhauer the 
very exercise of knowing presupposes a division of subject and object, whereas the 
world-as-will is unindividuated (and thus unknowable). An Idea is 
 
necessarily [an] object, something known, a representation, and precisely, but only, in this 
respect is it different from the thing-in-itself[…] [I]t alone is the most adequate objectivity 
possible of the will or of the thing-in-itself; indeed it is even the whole thing-in-itself, only 
under the form of the representation. (WWR1: 175) 
 
However, while this might explain the need for an intermediary stage between 
phenomena and reality, it does not seem self-evident why the subject-object division 
should entail a multitude of Ideas (of clouds, panthers etc.), which correspond 
unambiguously to the way ordinary language carves up the phenomenal world, rather 
than to a simpler duality. We shall return to this difficulty later. 
 To return to the broader matter in question, where does art feature in this story? 
The ability of a genius to perceive an Idea, even in its imperfect, particular instances, 
enables her to create works of art: beautiful things that express “purely the Idea of 
(their) species through the very distinct, clearly defined, and thoroughly significant 
relation of (their) parts.” (WWR1: 210) For example, by observing real clouds, the 
artist can create representations of beautiful, almost “Ideal” clouds. It is by 
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contemplation of such works of art that perception of Ideas is more readily available 
even to lesser minds. Therefore, the epistemic value of a work of art is that it 
smoothens the contemplation of the Idea it represents: “The work of art is merely a 
means of facilitating that knowledge in which this (aesthetic) pleasure consists.” 
(WWR1: 195) 
Knowledge of Ideas, then, involves a kind of direct perception of the essential, a 
priori, nature of a species, before these are individuated into particular instantiations 
by the principles of space, time and causality; and it is thus directly opposed to 
knowledge of scientific concepts, which is knowledge of abstract generalisations 
crafted by men a posteriori from observation of already individuated particulars. 
(WWR1: 190, 233-6). Thus, knowledge of a perfect leopard gained from an artwork is 
supposed to be different to and more profound than knowledge held by a zoologist 
dealing with leopards. Good art portrays Ideas and not concepts – indeed the artist’s 
knowledge of Ideas cannot be paraphrased in abstract, scientific terms, but can only 
be communicated through unmediated perception of his work. (WWR1: 235)  
We can now see just how radical Schopenhauer’s claims are. Firstly, knowledge of 
the thing-in-itself is possible, and it is gained through the knowledge of the essential 
nature of objects – Ideas. Secondly, this knowledge is not conceptual, but comes to us 
directly through perception. And thirdly, this knowledge is to be gained through 
disinterested contemplation of the works of art. Thus, not only is art epistemically 
significant, but is also the source of the profoundest type of knowledge. 
How plausible is all of this when applied to a particular work of art? Let's take a 
promising example, Thomas Hardy's Proud Songsters. It may be felt particularly 
appropriate not just because it is short, but because we know Hardy was himself 
inspired by Schopenhauer in some of his writings. 
 
Proud Songsters 
The thrushes sing as the sun is going,  
And the finches whistle in ones and pairs,  
And as it gets dark loud nightingales  
In bushes  
Pipe, as they can when April wears,  
As if all Time were theirs.  
 
These are brand-new birds of twelve-months’ growing,  
Which a year ago, or less than twain,  
No finches were, nor nightingales,  
Nor thrushes,  
But only particles of grain,  
And earth, and air, and rain. 
 
VID SIMONITI 
 
 23 
How does Schopenhauer's account of epistemic value of art apply here? Well, we may 
note that there is some peculiar insight about these birds, the passing of seasons and 
the way we perceive them that we obtain by reading the poem. This knowledge is not 
empirical or similar to the knowledge of natural sciences: the merit of the poem does 
not consist in merely adorning some statement about the nature of birds' breeding 
cycles with rhyme and rhythm. Furthermore, the peculiar knowledge of the poem is in 
a sense directly perceived in the poem – the poem is not a paraphrase, a conceptual 
summing-up of the knowledge it yields to us. An attempt at a paraphrase of the 
poem's content, such as “Everything in nature, including birds, often seems significant 
and valuable, however, it is really just made of matter from which no such value can 
be deduced, and this fact inspires in human beings a mixture of melancholia and 
awe.” may count as a kind of interpretation, but is not equivalent to the direct 
perception of the poem itself. The peculiarity of the knowledge inherent in the poem 
is perhaps contained in the feeling that the poem is “profound”, expressing more than 
its paraphrase. This seems well accounted for in Schopenhauer's account of Ideas: we 
can explain such profundity by saying that Hardy's poem points us in the direction of 
the Idea of those birds, as well as the Ideas of nature and existence more broadly.  
However, while it seems to me that it is appropriate and worthwhile to talk, with 
Schopenhauer, of the epistemic value of Hardy’s poem to account for its profundity, 
problems might arise when one tries to probe further into the role played by 
Schopenhauerian Ideas in this account. One might feel, and I think quite justifiably, 
that talk of Ideas actually distracts from Schopenhauer’s main insight as to the 
epistemic value of art, making the account needlessly complicated and dependent on a 
rather murky ontological category. In particular, Ideas seem an odd concept because, 
as facets of the thing-in-itself, they are supposed to be free of the categories of space, 
time and causality; but, as soon as one considers what a particular Idea is supposed to 
be, it becomes difficult to see how that could be the case. This difficulty can be 
observed on Schopenhauer’s own examples of Ideas. For instance, if it is contained in 
an Idea of a cloud that it behaves as an “inelastic, perfectly mobile, formless and 
transparent fluid,” (WWR1: 182) or if it is the Idea of human history that certain types 
of events always obtain (WWR1: 182-3), then it will seem at least curious to us that 
these purportedly essential characteristics (e.g. elasticity and repetition of historical 
events) all seem to be already familiar to us from the realm of space, time and 
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causality; they already seem to exist in the world-as-representation.1 It is my 
impression that any further investigation into the nature of Ideas which would try to 
resolve this apparent tension would have to work very hard if it is to avoid two 
equally disagreeable options: either likening Ideas to run-of-the-mill empirical 
generalizations or shrouding them in metaphysical mystery, depicting them as strange 
categories that somehow happen to have both noumenal and phenomenal properties. 
Both of these options bear implausible consequences for the corresponding aesthetic 
theory: in the first case the knowledge of Ideas of finches, nightingales and thrushes 
gained from Hardy’s poem is made akin to the knowledge of the birds’ general 
features obtained from empirical observations, in the second it is knowledge of some 
obscure metaphysical wonder that somehow connects to these birds. Neither of these 
explanations, I think, does much to illuminate what goes on in an aesthetic 
experience. It may be that one could try to secure a better concept of what Ideas are 
and this may well be pursued by those more inclined than me to see such an 
investigation as a fruitful one; however, given the unease I think I have shown we can 
legitimately feel at any invocation of Ideas, coupled with the request that they be 
understood not metaphorically but as genuine ontological or epistemic categories, it 
seems to me that a Schopenhauerian theory of aesthetics would be better off if it did 
not have to rely on this rather troublesome postulation. Can this be achieved? 
Fortunately, there seem to be two senses in which Schopenhauer thinks art 
communicates knowledge of the thing-in-itself, even though he himself does not 
clearly distinguish between them. The first of these two senses is the one we have just 
addressed, namely that knowledge of the thing-in-itself is available to us through 
contemplation of Ideas that are portrayed in art. We have suggested that in this, 
“essentialist” sense, the nature of the knowledge available in art is in fact left largely 
unexplained, due to the problems arising from the obscure nature of the Ideas 
themselves. However, there is another way in which art is supposed to communicate 
knowledge of the thing-in-itself, namely by articulating the willing nature of objects 
represented. I will call this other sense of Schopenhauer’s account the “will-in-art” 
argument and it is this line of argument that I will pursue now. 
Schopenhauer frequently rehearses this argument. For example, he writes that 
animal portraiture is of interest because in animal painting “the phenomenon of will 
                                                 
1
  A similar point is raised by Ivan Soll, see Soll (1998), p. 95. 
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… is exhibited […] with a distinctness verging on the grotesque and monstrous” 
(WWR1: 219), and that tragedy is to be placed above the other literary genres because 
it best expresses “the antagonism of the will with itself.” (WWR1: 253) We could 
imagine something similar being said about Hardy's poem. Now, Schopenhauer’s 
claim that the value of art lies with its propensity to reveal the willing nature of the 
world is not quite the same as his “essentialist” account. While the “essentialist” 
account says that art communicates the perfect, Ideal ways in which phenomenal 
things should be, the “will-in-art” argument says that art reveals the thing-in-itself (i.e. 
the Will) by bringing to attention how the subject of the work of art is a phenomenal 
instantiation of the principles of the World Will. As we have seen, to account for what 
is special about aesthetic knowledge – how the understanding communicated by 
Hardy’s poem is different from scientific, paraphrasable, empirical observations – the 
plausibility of the “essentialist” story will depend on its being able to explain what the 
objects of such knowledge, Platonic Ideas, are. The “will-in-art” view, however, 
manages to account for the nature of aesthetic knowledge in a different way; the 
special epistemic value of art arises from the fact that both the work of art and its 
beholder are manifestations of the World Will:  
 
The possibility of [the] anticipation of the beautiful a priori by the artist, as well as of its 
recognition a posteriori by the connoisseur, is to be found in the fact that artist and 
connoisseur are themselves the “in-itself” of nature, the will objectifying itself. (WWR1: 
222)  
 
By contemplating a work of art, the beholder becomes aware of the World Will 
through a recognition of the willing nature of the artist’s subject; and this kind of 
knowledge is markedly different from empirical knowledge. It is a product of a more 
immediate, “partly a priori” (WWR1: 222) perception of the nature of the world (i.e. 
as Will), of which we are already tacitly aware, being willing subjects ourselves. In 
this respect Schopenhauer succeeds in showing that knowledge found in art is 
markedly different from the a posteriori knowledge of science: art is profound 
because it reveals to us something of the truth about its subject, which we have 
already, on some hidden level, understood. The knowledge of finches, nightingales 
and thrushes gained from the poem does not consist of learning some previously 
unknown (empirical) fact about them, but rather consists in an apt reformulation of 
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some already half-known truth of how things are, which we can agree to on the basis 
of our own human experience.  
 However, are we now guilty of just substituting one moot metaphysical concept for 
another? Is knowledge of the World Will any less odd than that of Platonic Ideas? 
Again, I will waive the metaphysical discussion, and presume that it is preferable for 
any Schopenhauerian aesthetic theory not to commit itself to any of his more 
contentious metaphysical claims. Therefore, in the concluding remarks, I will briefly 
sketch a proposal as to how one might sever Schopenhauer’s metaphysics and yet 
keep his “will-in-art” account of the epistemic value of art largely intact. 
My proposal can be best understood as a change of language in Schopenhauer's 
account of world as Will rather than some dramatic overhaul of its content, and it 
takes its cue from the mistake that Schopenhauer makes in his introspective discovery 
of the thing-in-itself and his identifying it as Will. Schopenhauer first establishes that 
we experience ourselves not only as empirical observables, but also as willing 
subjects, and then he concludes that this inner experience of ours must also be the 
‘content’ of the rest of our world (cf. WWR1: 117-8). However, it is surely much 
simpler to describe Schopenhauer's introspection not as a discovery of some 
underlying metaphysical primordial matter, but simply as a particular way in which he 
experiences and characterizes human existence – as that of a willing subject. By the 
same token, if Schopenhauer thinks that the epistemic value of art consists in 
displaying the conflicting and striving nature of the world-as-will, it is much simpler 
to think of art as contemplating the nature of our own existence. Although we may 
wish to agree further with Schopenhauer in describing this existence as fundamentally 
willing, wretched and self-defeating, we need not do so. Rather, we could leave the 
exploration of the fundamentals of human existence to art itself or perhaps to a 
separate philosophical investigation. 
I have tried to show that it is human experience that provides the enduring appeal 
of Schopenhauer's aesthetics, even if his metaphysical infrastructure may require 
either an allegorical reading or complete removal. Once this has been achieved, 
however, the account of the epistemic value of art is preserved intact, only that the 
knowledge that art conveys no longer concerns the thing-in-itself but about our own 
existential experience. Furthermore, what is retained from Schopenhauer is the direct, 
unparaphrasable, “partly a priori” nature of knowledge gathered from such works of 
art; the onlooker, himself a part of the human race whose condition is being portrayed, 
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can recognise reflections of his own urges, strivings and experiences in the art he 
contemplates. Something already half-known, half-felt, “profound” is elucidated for 
her by art. 
As a postscript, perhaps something still needs to be said regarding the limitations 
of the claims we are making. While Schopenhauer (as illustrated by his discussion of 
the many different areas of art, from horticulture and animal portraiture to classical 
tragedy) arguably intended his theory to cover art universally, I think it would be 
doubtless futile on his or anyone's behalf to try to provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions that would cover everything that we are willing to call “a piece of art.” In 
that sense, to say that all art speaks of the human condition is either false of 
uninformative. Likewise, it would be wrong to say that the content, the human 
experience, communicated is the same in all works of art – Proud Songsters is of 
course not a paraphrase of Antigone. Rather than making such bold claims, 
Schopenhauerian aesthetics should instead be taken as saying something about the 
peculiar impression of profundity that strikes us when contemplating some works of 
art, and its merit is to account for this profundity without referring to either pleasure, 
institutionalism or relaying of a conceptual message, but by reference to an 
articulation of a particular, unifying experience shared by the artist and her audience. 
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